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1. Introduction 
Since the global financial crisis (2008-9), short-term riskless nominal interest rates in the Euro 
Area have been close to zero, while Euro Area inflation too has remained low (below the ECB’s 
target). Understanding this ‘low rates’ environment is one of the key challenges for economic 
analysis. This paper provides a novel perspective on the effect of a low-rates environment on the 
transmission of aggregate supply and demand disturbances, in a monetary union. The analysis is 
based on a two-country New Keynesian business cycle model of a monetary union with a zero 
lower bound (ZLB) constraint for the nominal interest rate.  
As is well-known from the closed economy macro literature (Benhabib et al. (2001a,b; 
2002a,b), the presence of the ZLB can give rise to multiple equilibria that exhibit self-fulfilling 
fluctuations of inflation and real activity, under the standard assumption that monetary policy 
follows an ‘active’ Taylor rule, i.e. a policy rule with a strong interest rate response when the 
inflation rate deviates from the central bank’s inflation target.  A liquidity trap, i.e. a situation in 
which the ZLB binds, can then be due to the self-fulfilling expectation that future inflation and 
output will be low. Mertens and Ravn (2014) and Aruoba et al. (2018) have shown that when a 
closed economy liquidity trap is caused by pessimistic expectations, then a rise in government 
purchases has a deflationary effect, which mutes the rise in GDP triggered by the fiscal shock. 
The mechanism is that a rise in government purchases triggers a rise in the real interest rate. In a 
pessimism-driven liquidity trap, the rise in the real rate is brought about by a fall in the (current 
and expected future) inflation rate. This deflationary effect dampens the rise in output.  
The contribution of the present paper is to study beliefs-driven liquidity traps in a 
monetary union, in order to shed light on key policy issues facing the Euro Area. The model 
assumes fully integrated goods markets and financial markets. Each country produces a distinct 
set of goods, while consuming both domestic and imported goods. Due to a spending bias 
towards locally produced goods, consumer price index (CPI) inflation can differ across countries. 
The union’s central bank follows a Taylor rule that targets union-wide inflation.  
In this setting, I study beliefs-driven sunspot equilibria that feature an occasionally 
binding ZLB. The baseline model predicts that, in a liquidity trap, a rise in government purchases 
in country ‘Home’ boosts local GDP, while ‘Foreign’ GDP falls; thus, the cross-country 
transmission of fiscal spending shocks is negative. The domestic government spending multiplier 
is smaller than unity. The fall in Foreign GDP is smaller (in absolute value) than the rise in 
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Home GDP. The finding of a weak domestic fiscal multiplier resonates with Mertens and Ravn’s 
(2014) prediction of a muted response of output to fiscal spending shocks, in a closed economy 
liquidity trap. The weak (negative) transmission (of a Home government purchases increase) to 
Foreign GDP reflects the muted rise in Home GDP, which only generates a weak demand 
spillover to Foreign output. At the ZLB, a positive shock to Home government purchases triggers 
a fall in average union-wide inflation, which dampens the response of union-wide output. The 
Home terms of trade improve, which tends to shift private-sector demand towards Foreign 
goods. However, price rigidity dampens this competitiveness effect, which contributes to the 
weak (negative) response of Foreign GDP. The model here predicts that country-specific private 
sector demand shocks too induce asymmetric responses of domestic and foreign output. By 
contrast, a country-specific rise in total factor productivity (TFP) raises both domestic and 
foreign GDP. 
The effect of the expectations-driven liquidity traps considered here differs from that of 
liquidity traps triggered by large adverse exogenous aggregate demand shocks, such as an 
autonomous fall in households’ subjective discount rates. Liquidity traps of the latter type have 
been studied by an extensive literature; see, e.g., the closed economy models of Krugman (1998), 
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Christiano et al. (2011), Holden (2016,2019) and Roeger 
(2015). That literature predicts that fiscal spending multipliers can be much larger at the ZLB 
than when the ZLB does not bind. A key assumption of that literature is that, once the economy 
has escaped from a liquidity trap induced by a large adverse demand shock, agents expect that 
the economy will never again enter a liquidity trap. The large predicted fiscal multipliers during 
a liquidity trap of this type are due to the fact that, with a forward looking Phillips curve, a small 
increase in the expected inflation rate, at the date at which the economy permanently emerges 
from the liquidity trap, has a large positive effect on inflation and output in earlier periods. 
Widely discussed studies by Erceg and Lindé (2010) and Blanchard et al. (2016) have presented 
models of a monetary union in which a ZLB episode is triggered by a large adverse demand 
shock. These authors find that, at the ZLB, a country-specific rise in government purchases can 
have a strong positive effect on domestic and foreign output, i.e. the predicted international fiscal 
spillover is sizable. This theory provides a basis to the view that, in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis, fiscal ‘austerity’ (and weak demand more generally) in Germany contributed to 
the slump in the rest of the Euro Area (e.g., US Treasury (2013), Krugman (2013), Wolf (2013)). 
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It also predicts that expansionary fiscal policy in Germany (and other Euro Area core countries) 
could significantly help the Euro Area ‘periphery’, in a low interest rate environment. The 
present paper cautions against the idea of strong cross-border fiscal transmission in a monetary 
union, during a liquidity trap. If a liquidity trap is caused by self-fulfilling pessimism about 
future inflation, then cross-country fiscal spending spillovers can be much weaker than in a 
liquidity trap induced by an adverse aggregate demand shock.  
 
2. Model of a monetary union 
I consider a New Keynesian open economy model with a standard structure of goods, labor and 
financial markets (e.g., Kollmann (2001, 2002, 2004)). There are two countries, referred to as 
Home (H) and Foreign (F), that belong to a monetary union. A common central bank sets the 
short-term nominal interest for both countries. In each country there are: (i) a government that 
makes exogenous purchases which are financed using lump-sum taxes; (ii) a representative 
infinitely-lived household; (iii) monopolistic firms that produce a continuum of differentiated 
tradable intermediate goods using domestic labor; (iv) competitive firms that bundle domestic 
and imported intermediates into  composite non-tradable goods that are used for household and 
government consumption. Intermediate goods prices are sticky; all other prices are flexible. Each 
country’s household owns the domestic firms, and it supplies labor to those firms (labor is 
immobile internationally). The labor market is competitive. For analytical tractability, the model 
abstracts from physical capital. The Foreign country is a mirror image of the Home country. The 
following description focuses on the Home country. Analogous conditions describe the Foreign 
country.  
 
2.1. Home firms 
The Home country’s household consumes a composite final consumption good ,H tC  that is 
produced using the Cobb-Douglas technology 
1
, , ,( / ) ( /(1 ))
H F
H t H t H tC Y Y
ξ ξξ ξ −≡ − where ,HH tY  and ,FH tY  
are, respectively, a composite of domestic intermediate goods and a composite of imported 
intermediates, used by country H. (The superscript on intermediate good quantities denotes the 
country of origin, while the subscript indicates the destination country.) There is a bias towards 
using local intermediates, in household consumption: 0.5<ξ<1. Each country produces a distinct 
5 
 
set of intermediates indexed by s∈[0,1]. (Intermediate good ‘s’ produced by country H differs 
from intermediate ‘s’ produced by country F.) The composite intermediate ,
k
H tY  is given by 
1
( 1)/ /( 1)
, ,
0
{ ( ( )) }k kH t H tY y s ds
ν ν ν ν− −≡ ∫ with ν>1, for k=H,F,  where , ( )kH ty s   is the quantity of the variety s 
input produced by country k  that is sold to country H.  
Home government consumption, denoted , ,H tG  too is a composite of intermediary inputs, 
but government consumption only uses local intermediates (no imports).
1
 Specifically, 
1
( 1) / /( 1)
, ,
0
{ ( ( )) }HH t H tG g s ds
ν ν ν ν− −≡ ∫ , where  , ( )HH tg s  is the quantity of the Home produced variety s 
input that enters Home government consumption. 
Let , ( )k tp s  be the price of intermediate good s produced by country k.  Cost minimization 
in Home final good production implies: , , , ,( ) ( ( )/ )
k k
H t k t H t H ty s p s P Y
ν−=  for k=H,F  and 
, , , ,( ) ( ( )/ ) ,
H
H t H t H t H tg s p s P G
ν−=  as well as , , , ,/ ,HH t H t H t H tY CPI C Pξ= ⋅ ⋅  , , , ,(1 ) /FH t H t H t F tY CPI C Pξ= − ⋅ ⋅  where 
1
1 1/(1 )
, ,
0
{ ( ) }k t k t
s
P p s dsν ν− −=≡ ∫  and 1, , ,( ) ( ) .H t H t F tCPI P Pξ ξ−≡  ,k tP  is a price index of  intermediates 
produced by country k=H,F. Perfect competition implies that the country H final consumption 
good price index is ,H tCPI  (its marginal cost).  
The technology of the firm that produces intermediate good s in country H is: 
, , ,( ) ( ),H t H t H ty s L sθ=  where , ( )H ty s  and , ( )H tL s  are the firm’s output and labor input at date t, 
while , 0H tθ >  is exogenous productivity in country H (all intermediate good producers located 
in a country have identical productivity).  The firm’s good is sold domestically and exported: 
, , , ,( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).
H H H
H t H t F t H ty s y s y s g s= + +   
Intermediate good producers face quadratic costs to adjusting their prices. The real profit, 
in units of Home consumption, of the firm that produces Home intermediate good s is:   
           
21
, , , , , , , , 1 , 12
( ) ( ( ) / ) ( ) / ([ ( ) ( )] / ) ,H t H t H t H t H t H t H t H t H ts p s W y s CPI p s p s Pπ θ ψ − −≡ − − ⋅ − Π⋅   ψ>0 
                                                 
1 Empirically, the import content of government spending is much lower than that of private consumption (e.g., 
Bussiere et al. (2013). The main results below do not depend on assuming that the government consumption basket 
differs from the household consumption basket.  
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where ,H tW  is the nominal wage rate in country H. The last term in the profit equation is the real 
price adjustment cost, where 1Π >  is the central bank’s gross inflation target (see below).2 The 
firm sets , ( )
H
H tp s  to maximizes the present value of profits , ,0 ( )
H
t t t H tE sτ ττ ρ π∞ + +=∑ , where ,Ht t τρ +  is 
the Home household’s intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption between 
periods t and t+τ.  All Home intermediate good firms face identical decision problems, and they 
set identical prices: , ,( )H t H tp s P=  ∀ s∈[0,1]. The labor input and output too are equated across all 
Home intermediate good firms.  
The Home terms of trade and the real exchange rate (CPI-based) are , ,/t H t F tq P P≡  and 
, ,
/ ,H t F ttRER CPI CPI≡  respectively. Note that 2 1( ) .t tRER q ξ −=  Due to household consumption home 
bias (2ξ-1>0), the real exchange rate is an increasing function of the terms of trade. The real 
price of the domestic intermediate good, in units of final consumption, too is an increasing 
function of the terms of trade:  
                                                          
1
, ,/ ( ) .H t H t tP CPI q
ξ−=                                                               (1)       
 
2.2. Household preferences and labor supply  
The intertemporal preferences of the representative Home household are described by 
0 , , ,0
( , )t H t H t H ttE U C Lβ∞= Ψ∑  where ,H tC  and ,H tL  are final consumption and aggregate hours 
worked, respectively. 0<β<1 is the household’s steady state subjective discount factor and 
1 1/1
, , , ,1 1/
( , ) ln( ) ( )H t H t H t H tU C L C L
η
η
+
+= −  is the agent’s period utility function, where η>0 is the 
Frisch labor supply elasticity. , 0H tΨ >  is a stationary exogenous preference shock that alters the 
household’s rate of time preference. The household equates the marginal rate of substitution 
between leisure and consumption to the real wage rate, which implies  
                                                
1/
, , , ,(1/ )( / ) ( )H t H t H t H tC W CPI L η= .                                                 (2) 
 
                                                 
2 The price adjustment cost is assumed to be a quadratic function of , , 1( ) ( )
H H
H t H tp s p s−− Π⋅  (and not of 
, , 1( ) ( ),
H H
H t H tp s p s−−  as e.g. in the Rotemberg (1982) cost adjustment original specification). This ensures that the long-
run Phillips curve is vertical, if steady state inflation equals the central bank’s inflation target.  
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2.3. Financial markets 
The model assumes complete international financial markets, and so consumption risk is 
efficiently shared across countries. In equilibrium, the ratio of Home to Foreign households’ 
marginal utilities of consumption is, thus, proportional to the Home real exchange rate 
(Kollmann, 1991, 1995; Backus and Smith, 1993). With log utility, this implies that the relative 
Home/Foreign marginal utility of consumption is proportional to the Home real exchange rate: 
, , , ,{ / }/{ / } ,H t H t F t F t tC C RERΨ Ψ =Λ where Λ  is a date- and state-invariant term that reflects the 
(relative) initial wealth of the two countries. I assume that the two countries have the same initial 
wealth, i.e. Λ=1.  Thus:  
                                                      , , , ,/ ( / )/ .H t F t H t F t tC C RER= Ψ Ψ                                                      (3) 
There is also a market for a one-period riskless nominal bond (in zero net supply). The 
nominal interest rate on that bond is 1ti +  between periods t and t+1. The Home household’s Euler 
equation for this bond is:   
                                        1 , 1 , , , 1 , 1(1 ) ( / )( / )/ 1,
CPI
t t H t H t H t H t H ti E C Cβ+ + + ++ Ψ Ψ Π =                                        (4) 
where , 1 , 1 ,/
CPI
H t H t H tCPI CPI+ +Π ≡  is the Home gross CPI inflation rate between periods t and t+1.  
 
2.4. Monetary policy 
The monetary union’s central bank sets the interest rate 1ti +  according to a feedback rule that 
targets the union-wide average CPI inflation rate 1 1, ,2 2
CPI CPI
t H t F tΠ ≡ Π + Π  subject to the zero lower 
bound (ZLB) constraint 1 0.ti + ≥  Specifically, the monetary policy rule is  
                                      11 {1, / ( / ) ( )}t ti Max πβ γ β++ = Π + ⋅ Π −Π , 1πγ >                                           (5) 
where Π>1 is the central bank’s gross inflation target. Π/β is the  gross nominal interest rate that 
obtains when the union-wide inflation rate equals the central bank’s inflation target. πγ is a 
parameter that captures the central bank’s policy response to inflation. The ‘Taylor principle’
( 1)πγ >  is assumed to hold: as long as the ZLB constraint remains slack, a rise in inflation by 1 
percentage point (ppt) triggers a rise of the policy rate by more than 1 ppt.  
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2.5. Market clearing  
Market clearing in the country k=H,F labor market requires 
1
, ,
0
( ) .k t k t
s
L L s ds==∫  Real GDP ,( )k tY  
equals aggregate intermediate good output, , , , .k t k t k tY Lθ=  Markets for individual intermediates 
clear as intermediate good firms meet all demand at posted prices. This implies 
, , , ,
k k
k t H t F t k tY Y Y G= + +  i.e. aggregate intermediate good output equals the sum of aggregate domestic 
and foreign intermediate good demand. Using the intermediate good demand functions described 
above, this condition can be expressed as , , , , , , , ,/ (1 ) /H t H t H t H t F t F t H t H tY CPI C P CPI C P Gξ ξ= + − +  and 
, , , , , , , ,(1 ) / / .F t H t H t F t F t F t F t F tY CPI C P CPI C P Gξ ξ= − + +   
 
2.6. Solving the model 
Following much of the previous literature on macro models with a ZLB constraint (see Holden 
(2016, 2019) for detailed references), I linearize all equations, with the exception of the interest 
rate rule (5). This allows to capture the macroeconomic effects of the occasionally binding ZLB 
constraint, while keeping analytical tractability.  
I take a linear approximation around a steady state in which (in both countries) the gross 
inflation rate equals the inflation target Π; the corresponding steady state gross interest rate is 
1 /i β+ =Π . Let l ( )/t tx x x x≡ −  denote the relative deviation of a variable tx  from its steady state 
value x≠0 (variables without time subscript denote steady state values). To simplify the 
analytical expressions, I assume that government purchases are zero, in steady state.
 3
  I define 
m
, , /k t k t kG G Y≡  as the ratio of government purchases to steady state GDP in country k=H,F.  
Linearization of the risk-sharing condition (3) and of the goods market clearing 
conditions gives:  
                                      n n l n n, , , ,(2 1)H t F t t H t F tC C qξ− = − − + Ψ −Ψ ,                                          (6) 
  m n n l n, , , ,(1 ) 2 (1 ) ,H t H t F t t H tY C C q Gξ ξ ξ ξ= + − − − +    m n n l n, , , ,(1 ) 2 (1 )F t H t F t t F tY C C q Gξ ξ ξ ξ= − + + − + .        (7) 
                                                 
3 None of the substantive results hinge on this assumption. The analysis below will allow for both positive and 
negative shocks to government purchases. An interpretation of negative government purchases is that government 
occasionally has an autonomous supply of resources that it distributes to the private sector. Or think of government 
purchases as an additive technology shock that subtracts (for G>0) or adds (for G<0) resources from/to the private 
sector technology (Kollmann (1991)).   
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The linearized bond Euler equation (4) of country k=H,F is:  
                                    n n n m n n1 , 1 , 1 , , , 11 { }CPIt t k t k t k t k t k ti E C C+ + + ++ = Π + − +Ψ −Ψ .                                     (8) 
Linearizing the first-order condition of the intermediate good firms’ decision problem in 
country k=H,F gives a standard ‘forward-looking’ Phillips equation:   
                                            n n n, , , 1,k t w k t t k tmc Eκ β +Π = ⋅ + Π                                                      (9) 
where , , , 1/k t k t k tP P −Π ≡  is the gross inflation rate of the producer price index (PPI) in country k, 
while , , , ,( / ) /k t H t H t H tmc W Pθ= is real marginal cost (deflated by the domestic producer price) in the 
same country’s intermediate good sector (e.g., Kollmann (2002)). 0wκ >  is a coefficient that is a 
decreasing function of the price adjustment-cost parameter ψ. Using the nominal wage implied 
by the Home household’s labor supply equation (2) (and the analogous Foreign equation) allows 
to express Home and Foreign real marginal costs as:  
          n n m m l1 1, , , ,(1 ) (1 )H t H t H t H t tmc C Y qη η θ ξ= + − + − −  and n n m m l1 1, , , ,(1 ) (1 ) .F t F t F t F t tmc C Y qη η θ ξ= + − + + −        (10) 
Expressing the interest rate rule (5) using ‘hatted’ variables gives  
                                    n m1(1 ) { ( )/ , }.t ti Max πβ γ++ = − Π− Π ⋅Π                                              (11) 
Note that the interest rate n1(1 )ti ++  is a non-linear function of union-wide inflation. The ZLB 
constraint binds when m ( )/ .tπγ βΠ ≤ − Π− Π  
 All exogenous variables follow univariate AR(1) processes. For simplicity, I assume that 
all exogenous variables have the same autocorrelation ρ, with 0<ρ<1. Thus, n m, 1 , , 1k t k t k tθθ ρθ ε+ += + ,    
n m
, 1 , , 1
G
k t k t k tG Gρ ε+ += +    and n n, 1 , , 1k t k t k tρ ε Ψ+ +Ψ = Ψ +  for k=H,F where  , 1 , 1 , 1, ,Gk t k t k tθε ε ε Ψ+ + +  are exogenous 
mean-zero innovations.   
 
2.6.1. Union-wide inflation and output 
In what follows, variables without country (H or F) subscripts denote union-wide averages. 
Union-wide consumption, GDP, productivity, government purchases and preference shocks 
(expressed as deviations from steady state values) are l n n1 1, ,2 2 ,t H t F tC C C≡ +   l m m1 1, ,2 2 ,t H t F tY Y Y≡ +  
l m m1 1
, ,2 2
,t H t F tθ θ θ= +  l n n1 1, ,2 2t H t F tG G G= + and m n n1 1, ,2 2 ,t H t F tΨ ≡ Ψ + Ψ  respectively. Note that l l lt t tY C G= +   
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holds (from market clearing condition (7)), i.e. union-wide output equals union-wide 
consumption plus government purchases. Union-wide CPI inflation equals union-wide PPI 
inflation: m n n n1 1, ,2 2 .CPIt t H t FtΠ ≡Π = Π + Π   Averaging the Home and Foreign Phillips equations (9) 
(using the expression for real marginal cost (10)) gives a union-wide Phillips curve:  
                             m l l l n1 11( ) ,t t t t t tC G Eηκ θ β ++Π = ⋅ − + + Π  with (1 )/ 0.w η ηκ κ + >≡                         (12) 
Averaging the Home and Foreign Euler equations (8) gives:  
                                             n n n l n m1 1 1 11 { ( )}t t t t t t ti E C C+ + + ++ = Π + − − Ψ −Ψ .                                           (13)     
Combining the union-wide Euler equation (13) and the interest rate rule (11), and substituting 
out union-wide consumption using the union-wide Phillips curve (12) gives the following non-
linear expectational difference equation for union-wide inflation: 
                    m m n n 11 1 2{ ( )/ , } (1 ) ,t t t t t t tMax E E rβ βπ κ κ κβ γ + + +− Π− Π ⋅Π = − Π + + Π − Π +                       (14) 
        with  m l n l n m l l m1 11 1 11 1{( ) ( ) ( )} (1 ){ }t t t t t t t t t t tr E G G Gη ηθ θ ρ θ+ + ++ +≡ − − − − Ψ − Ψ = − − + + Ψ .   
I will call (14) the union-wide “Euler-Phillips” equation. The term tr  reflects expected one-
period ahead changes of exogenous variables. If prices were flexible (κ=∞), the union-wide 
expected  risk-free gross real interest rate between dates t and t+1 (expressed as a deviation from 
the steady state rate) would be tr . I refer to tr  as the (union-wide) natural real interest rate.  
Note that the natural real interest rate is a decreasing function of the date t level of 
(union-wide) productivity and an increasing function of government purchases and of the 
preference shock. As these forcing variables follow AR(1) processes with autocorrelation ρ, the 
natural rate too is an AR(1) process with autocorrelation ρ. Because of the assumed mean 
reversion of productivity, a positive productivity shock reduces the expected future growth rate 
of productivity; in a flex-prices economy, a positive productivity shock increases consumption 
on impact; future consumption rises less than current consumption, i.e. the expected growth rate 
of consumption falls, and hence the real natural interest rate drops. Similar logic explains why 
positive fiscal spending and preference shocks raise the natural real interest rate.  
 As first shown by Benhabib et al. (2001a,b; 2002a,b), a non-linear inflation equation of 
form (14) has multiple bounded solutions (see discussion below).  Given a process for union-
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wide inflation m{ }tΠ  that solves the Euler-Phillips equation (14), one can determine union-wide 
consumption, GDP and the nominal interest rate using (12) and (13).  
 
2.6.2. Country-level variables 
Country-level inflation, consumption and output depend on the terms of trade. Note that Home 
and Foreign inflation, consumption and output can be expressed as functions of union-wide 
variables and of cross-country differences of the corresponding variables:  
          m m m n1, , ,2 ( ),i t t i t j tΠ =Π + Π −Π m l m m1, , ,2 ( ),i t t i t j tC C C C= + −  m l m m1, , ,2 ( )i t t i t j tY Y Y Y= + −   for i,j=H,F; j≠i.            (15)    
Relative (Home vs. Foreign) gross PPI inflation equals the change of the Home terms of trade: 
n n l m
, , 1.H t F t t tq q −Π −Π = −  Relative consumption is a function of the terms of trade and of the relative 
preference shock (see (6)). Relative output can be expressed as a function of the terms of trade, 
of the relative preference shock and of relative government purchases (from (6) and (7)):   
                                      m m l n n n n, , , , , ,(2 1)( ) ( )H t F t t H t F t H t F tY Y q G Gξ− = − + − Ψ −Ψ + − .                                 (16)  
Subtracting the Foreign Phillips curve from the Home Phillips curve (see (9)) gives 
n n n n n n
, , , , , 1 , 1( ) { }.H t F t w H t F t t H t F tmc mc Eκ β + +Π −Π = ⋅ − + Π −Π  Thus, l m n n m l1 , , 1( ) { }.t t w H t F t t t tq q mc mc E q qκ β− +− = ⋅ − + −   
Relative real marginal cost can be written as (using (6),(7),(10)):  
            n n l m m n n n n1 1 2 11, , , , , , , ,( ) ( ) ( )H t F t t H t F t H t F t H t F tmc mc q G Gη η η ξη η η ηθ θ+ + + −− =− − − + − + Ψ −Ψ .  
Combining these expressions, we see that the terms of trade are governed by the difference 
equation  
              m l m m m n n n n1 2 11 11 1 , , , , , ,1 1( ) ( ) ( )t t t t H t F t H t F t H t F tE q q q G Gκ β η ξκ κ κβ β β η β β ηθ θ+ + + −+ − + += − + − − − − Ψ −Ψ .           (17)                
0<β<1 and κ>0 ensure that equation (17) has a unique non-explosive solution 
                            l m m m n n n n1 , , , , , ,( ) ( ) ( )t t H t F t G H t F t H t F tq q a a G G aθ θ θ− Ψ= Ξ ⋅ − − + − + Ψ −Ψ ,                        (18)                     
with 0 1<Ξ<  and , , 0Ga a aθ Ψ > . Ξ  is a root of the polynomial  
                                                          
12 1( ) 0.z z zκ ββ β
+ +Γ ≡− + − =  4                                                  (19)   
                                                 
4 2 0.5/2 (( /2) 1/ )a a βΞ= − −  with (1 )/ ;a κ β β≡ + +  ( / )/ , (1/(1 ))( / )/ , (( 2 1)/(1 ))( / )/ ,Ga a aθ κ β ζ η κ β ζ η ξ η κ β ζΨ≡− ≡− + ≡− + − +   
where 0.aζ ρ≡Ξ+ − <  
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(18) shows that the terms of trade are a function of current and lagged relative (Home/Foreign) 
productivity, government purchases and preference shocks. A rise in relative Home productivity 
worsens the Home terms of trade, while a rise in Home government purchases and in the Home 
preference parameter HΨ  improves the Home terms of trade. Price stickiness affects the 
dynamics of the terms of trade: when prices are more sticky (lower Phillips-curve slope κ), the 
terms of trade respond more sluggishly to exogenous shocks.  
Given the terms of trade process (18), relative (Home/Foreign) output and consumption 
are uniquely pinned down by (6) and (16).  Given a process for union-wide inflation and output, 
the country-level variables can then be determined using (15). Importantly, monetary policy 
affects union-wide output and inflation, but it does not affect the terms of trade and relative 
(Home vs. Foreign) variables. While union-wide inflation and output are indeterminate, relative 
variables are determinate.    
 
2.7. Flex-prices model 
A flex-prices (Real Business Cycle, RBC) model provides a useful benchmark for understanding 
the dynamics of real variables in the sticky-prices economy. (The flex-prices model is a special 
case of the model outlined above in which price adjustment costs are zero, ψ=0, and the slope of 
the Phillips curve is infinite, κ=∞.) The flex-prices equilibrium allocation is described by:  
m m m n n(1 )
, , , , ,1 1
( )i t i t i t i t j tY G
η ξ η
η ηθ −+ += + − ⋅ Ψ −Ψ ,   for i∈{H,F}; 
m m m m m n n1 (1 )(2 )
, , , , , , ,1 1 1
(1 ) ( )i t i t j t i t j t i t j tC G G
ξ ξ ξ ξ η
η η ηξθ ξ θ − − ++ + += + − − − + ⋅ Ψ −Ψ   for i,j∈{H,F}, i≠j; 
l n n m m n n2 1 1
, , , , , ,1 1
( ) ( ) ( )t H t F t H t F t H t F tq G G
ξ η
η ηθ θ− ++ += ⋅ Ψ −Ψ − − + ⋅ − . 
Given log-utility preferences and a unit substitution elasticity between domestic and imported 
inputs in private consumption, output in country i only depends (positively) on domestic 
productivity and on domestic government purchases, in a flex-prices world; by contrast, 
consumption in a given country depends positively on both domestic and foreign productivity, 
and negatively on domestic and foreign government purchases. The Home terms of trade are a 
decreasing function of relative (Home vs. Foreign) productivity and an increasing function of 
relative government purchases, under flexible prices. A positive shock to country i’s relative 
preference shock raises i’s consumption, and it lowers i’s output (as the rise in consumption 
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triggers a fall in labor supply). The terms of trade too are an increasing function of a country’s 
relative preference shock, under flexible prices.   
 
3. Expectations-driven liquidity traps 
3.1. Constant productivity, government purchases and preferences  
As pointed out above, the model has multiple bounded solutions. In order to see this in the 
simplest possible way, consider first an economy in which productivity, government purchases 
and the preference parameter Ψ are constant, so that the natural real interest rate is likewise 
constant: m1 0tr + =  ∀t. Given our assumption that the Taylor principle holds ( 1),πγ >  the union-wide 
Euler-Phillips equation (14) is then solved by two steady state (constant) inflation rates: l 0Π=  
and l ( )/ .βΠ=− Π− Π  The ZLB binds in the latter steady state. This finding is in line with 
Benhabib et al. (2001a,b) who shows (in a simpler model) that the combination of the ZLB and 
the Taylor rule produces two steady states, and that the ZLB binds in one of these steady states.   
There also exist stochastic equilibria with an occasionally binding ZLB. Those equilibria 
seem especially relevant empirically. Arifovic et al. (2018) and Aruoba et al. (2018) shows that 
there exist equilibria in which an exogenous random sunspot variable determines whether the 
ZLB constraint is slack or whether it binds. Assume that union-wide inflation follows a Markov 
chain with two possible values: m m m{ , }S BtΠ ∈ Π Π  such that m mB SΠ < Π and  
                                                        m m( )/ .B Sπ πγ β γΠ ≤ − Π− Π < Π                                               (20)         
Thus, the ZLB constraint binds when low inflation 
mBΠ  is realized; the ZLB constraint is slack 
when high inflation 
mSΠ  obtains. Denote the transition probabilities between union-wide inflation 
at dates t and at t+1 by n m m m1Prob( | )j iij t tp +≡ Π =Π Π =Π  for i,j ∈{S;B},  with  0 1ijp≤ ≤  and 1iS iBp p+ = , 
and let SS SB
BS BB
p p
p p
⎡ ⎤Φ ≡ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  be  the matrix of transition probabilities. Let 
l m m[ ; ]S BΠ ≡ Π Π
JJG
 (column 
vector). Expected future inflation is then n m m l1( | ) (1,:) ,St tE +Π Π =Π =Φ Π
JJG n m m l
1( | ) (2,:) ,
B
t tE +Π Π =Π =Φ Π
JJG
n m m i l
2( | ) (1,:) ,
S
t tE +Π Π =Π =Φ Π
JJG n m m i l
2( | ) (2,:) ,
B
t tE +Π Π =Π =Φ Π
JJG
  where i .Φ≡Φ×Φ  
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An equilibrium with an occasionally binding ZLB is defined by inflation rates 
m m
,S BΠ Π
and transition probabilities ,SS BBp p  such that the inequalities in (20) and the Euler-Phillips 
equation (14) hold:  
                                            m m l i l11 (1 ) (1,:) (1,:)S S β βπ κ κ κγ +Π = − Π + + Φ Π − Φ Π
JJG JJG
,                                (21) 
                                     m l i l11( )/ (1 ) (2,:) (2,:)B β βκ κ κβ +− Π− Π = − Π + + Φ Π − Φ Π
JJG JJG
.                            (22) 
Equations (21) and (22) are, respectively, the Euler-Phillips equation if the ZLB constraint is 
slack and if it binds.  
 
Model calibration 
One period in the model represents one quarter in calendar time. I set β=0.9975, which implies a 
1% per annum steady state riskless real interest rate. The Frisch labor supply elasticity is set at 
unity, η=1, a conventional value in macro models. The local content of private consumption 
spending is set at ξ=0.8. 5 The Central Bank’s quarterly gross inflation target is set at Π=1.005, 
in line with the (roughly) 2% annual inflation target of the ECB. The inflation coefficient of the 
interest rate rule (5) is set at the conventional value 1.5.πγ =  The slope coefficient wκ  of the 
Phillips curve (9) is set at a value such that the observationally equivalent Phillips curve implied 
by Calvo (1983) staggered price setting entails an average duration between price changes of 4 
quarters. This mean duration is consistent with empirical evidence on price setting in the Euro 
Area (see Kollmann (2001), Alvarez et al. (2006), Giovannini et al. (2019)).
6
  The preceding 
parameters are used in all simulations below.  
 The existence of an equilibrium with an occasionally binding ZLB constraint requires   
persistent inflation regimes, i.e. the probabilities  SSp  and BBp  have to be close to unity. 
Assume, for example, 0.95;SS BBp p= =  thus, if the economy is in a liquidity trap at date t, then 
there is a 95% probability that the liquidity trap will still be in effect at t+1; the average duration 
of a liquidity trap is 20 quarters. Then (20),(21) and (22) are solved by m 0.0080BΠ =−  and 
                                                 
5 This value of ξ matches the fact that, empirically, the ratio of within-Euro Area trade to EA GDP is about 20%.  
6 Under Calvo price setting, the slope of the Phillips curve (9) is (1 )(1 )/ ,w D D Dκ β= − −  where 1-D is the probability 
that an individual firm can change its price in a given period, so that the average duration between price changes is 
1/(1-D). I set D=0.75 (average stickiness of 4 periods), which implies 0.08395.wκ =  
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m -0.0011.SΠ =  This corresponds to annualized union-wide inflation rates in the states with 
binding and slack ZLB constraints of -1.22% and 1.55%, respectively. Union-wide GDP lY  in 
these two states is -0.22% and 0.20%, respectively. Unconditional mean output (-0.01%) is thus 
slightly below steady state, in the model with an occasionally binding ZLB. The nominal interest 
rate is 2.33% per annum in the non-ZLB state.
7
  
 
3.2. Time-varying productivity, government purchases and preference shocks  
I next consider an economy with time-varying productivity, government purchases and 
preference shocks. Interest centers on how the transmission of exogenous shocks depends on 
whether the ZLB constraint is slack or binding. I continue to assume that a Markov chain with 
transition probability matrix Φ determines in which periods the ZLB binds. That Markov chain is 
assumed independent of shocks to productivity, government purchases and preferences.  
 I construct equilibria in which union-wide inflation follows state-dependent linear policy 
functions of the (union-wide) natural real interest rate, tr :   
                                  
m B B B
t trμ λΠ = +   if the ZLB constraint binds at t;                                      (23) 
                                  
m S S S
t trμ λΠ = +    if the ZLB constraint is slack at t,                                  (24) 
                                              with   m m( )/ .B St tπ πγ β γΠ ≤ − Π− Π < Π                                               (25) 
The coefficients , , ,B B S Sμ λ μ λ  can be solved for using the method of undetermined coefficients 
(after substituting (23)-(24) into the Euler-Phillips equation (14)).   
 
3.2.1. Permanent liquidity trap 
To build intuition for equilibria with time-varying forcing variables and an occasionally binding 
ZLB constraint (discussed below), I first consider an economy that is in a permanent liquidity 
trap (so that the liquidity trap is an absorbing state, 1).BBp =  For that case, a closed-form model 
solution with time-varying forcing variables can readily be derived.  
                                                 
7With constant productivity and preference parameters, the terms of trade in the initial period, say t=0, 
0
q  pins down 
the path of the terms of trade in all subsequent periods. In the long-run, the terms of trade asymptotes to the steady 
state terms of trade. Assume that, by period t, the terms of trade in have converged (sufficiently close) to steady 
state. Then, output and prices are equated across countries, and equal to union-wide averages of those variables.  
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In a permanent liquidity trap, we have m m {( )/ }/Bt t πβ γΠ =Π ≤ − Π− Π   ∀t  (see (25)), and 
the Euler-Phillips equation (14) becomes:  
                                m n n 11 1 2( )/ (1 ) .B B Bt t t t t tE E rβ βκ κ κβ + + +− Π− Π = − Π + + Π − Π +                                 (26) 
Substitution of the policy function (23) into (26) gives:  
                  1 21( )/ { } (1 ){ } { } ,B B B B B Bt t t tr r r rβ βκ κ κβ μ λ μ λ ρ μ λ ρ+− Π− Π = − + + + + − + +                   (27) 
where I use the fact that 
n B B B s
t t s trμ λ ρ+Ε Π = +   for s≥0.  
(27) holds for arbitrary values of tr  iff ( )/Bμ β=− Π− Π   and  
1 21{ (1 ) } 1 0.Bβ βκ κ κρ ρ λ+− + + − + =  Thus, the slope of the policy function in a permanent liquidity 
trap is: 
1 211/{ (1 ) }.B β βκ κ κλ ρ ρ+=− − + + −  This can be written as ( / )/ ( )Bλ κ β ρ=− Γ , where ( )ρΓ  is 
the polynomial defined in (19). Note that 1(0) 0βΓ =− <  and (1) 0;κβΓ = >   furthermore '( ) 0ρΓ >  for 
0 1ρ≤ ≤ . Therefore,  ( ) 0ρΓ >  holds for 0 1ρ<Ξ< ≤  where Ξ  is the root of the polynomial ( ) 0Γ Ξ =  
that corresponds to the autoregressive coefficient of the law of motion of the terms of trade (18). 
For the values of β,κ assumed in the model calibration (see above), we have Ξ=0.67. Empirical 
estimates of the quarterly autocorrelation of productivity, government purchases (and other 
macroeconomic shocks) are typically in the range of 0.95. This implies that ( ) 0ρΓ >  holds for a 
plausible autocorrelation ρ. Throughout the subsequent discussion, it will be assumed that this 
condition is met. (The simulations below set ρ=0.95.) Thus, for plausible persistence of the 
forcing variables, 0
Bλ <  holds, i.e. a rise in the natural interest rate lowers the union-wide 
inflation rate, in a permanent liquidity trap. As the natural real interest rate is a decreasing 
function of productivity, and an increasing function of government purchases and of the 
household demand (preference) shifter Ψ, we find that inflation in a permanent liquidity trap is 
increasing in the aggregate supply (productivity) shock and decreasing in the aggregate demand 
(government purchases and preference shift) shocks.  
 A persistent rise in the union-wide natural real interest rate triggers a rise in the expected 
real interest rate. In a permanent liquidity trap, the nominal interest rate is stuck at zero, and the 
rise in the real interest rate is brought about by a fall in the union-wide inflation rate. This can be 
seen most easily when ρ  is very close to (but below) unity. Then m m n
1 2
,
B B B
t t t t tE E+ +Π ≈ Π ≈ Π  and (26) 
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gives n l( )/ ,Bt trβΠ ≈ − Π− Π − so that a positive shock to the natural real rate triggers (approximately) 
a one-to-one negative response of the current and expected future union-wide inflation rate.   
 I assume henceforth that ρ=0.95. Then the policy function for union-wide inflation in a 
permanent liquidity trap is 
                      
m l l m0.0074 1.070 0.0074 0.05 0.03 0.05 .B tt t t tr GθΠ = − − = − + − − Ψ                (28) 
Thus, a 1% percent increase in union-wide productivity raises union-wide (gross) inflation by 
0.05% (this corresponds to a rise of the annualized inflation rate by 0.2 percentage points); while 
a 1% increase in union-wide government purchases lowers gross inflation by 0.03%. 
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 In a permanent liquidity trap, the policy rule for union-wide output is  
                                        
m l l m0.0001 1.02 0.49 0.02 ,Bt t t tY Gθ= − + + − Ψ                                  (29) 
i.e. the union-wide government purchases multiplier is 0.49. Although the rise in government 
purchases lowers union-wide inflation (see above), the government purchases multiplier is 
positive, because a rise in government purchases lowers union-wide consumption, which raises 
union-wide labor supply.  
 
3.2.2. Permanently slack ZLB constraint 
I next consider an equilibrium in which the economy stays forever away from the ZLB. Then 
m m {( )/ }/St t πβ γΠ =Π > − Π− Π   ∀t  (see (25)), and the union-wide inflation rate is governed by the 
following Euler-Phillips equation (from (14)):  
                                    m m n n 11 1 2(1 ) .S S S St t t t t t tE E rβ βπ κ κ κγ + + +Π = − Π + + Π − Π +                                      (30) 
Substitution of policy rule (24) into (30) shows that the coefficients of the policy rule are  
                                       0Sμ =  and ( / )/{ ( ) ( / )}.S πλ κ β ρ γ κ β=− Γ − ⋅                                        (31) 
                                                 
8 The existence of an equilibrium with a permanent liquidity trap requires that the forcing variables are bounded, to 
ensure that 
l
( )/
B
tπγ βΠ ≤ − Π− Π  holds ∀t. For example, if productivity and the preference shifter take steady state 
values, then  9%
t
G ≥−  has to hold: when government purchases fall below this lower bound, then the inflation rate 
defined by (28) rises to a level which is such that the Taylor rule prescribes a strictly positive nominal interest rate, 
which violates the first inequality shown in (25). The subsequent analysis assumes that all exogenous forcing 
variables remain sufficiently close to steady state values, so that the inequalities in (25) are satisfied.   
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1πγ >  (Taylor principle) implies that ( ) ( / ) 0πρ γ κ βΓ − ⋅ <  ∀ 0≤ρ≤1, and so 0 :Sλ > when the 
ZLB is always slack, then a rise in the natural real interest rate triggers a rise in the inflation rate, 
and thus an increase in the nominal interest rate.   
 When the ZLB never binds, then a rise in productivity (which reduces the natural interest 
rate) lowers thus union-wide inflation, while positive aggregate demand shocks raise inflation. 
For ρ=0.95, the policy rule for union-wide inflation, under a permanently slack ZLB constraint is 
                                      
m  l l m1.77 0.09 0.04 0.09 ,St t t t tr GθΠ = = − + + Ψ                                   (32) 
while the policy rule for union-wide output is:  
                                                
m l l m0.97 0.51 0.03 .St t t tY Gθ= + + Ψ                                            (33) 
Quantitatively, the union-wide output responses to shocks are similar across the regimes with 
permanently binding/slack ZLB constraints. With a permanently slack ZLB constraint, union-
wide output is slightly less responsive to productivity shocks, but slightly more responsive to 
government purchase shocks than in the permanent liquidity trap (see (29),(33)). The shocks 
considered here are persistent. Thus, these shocks have a muted effect on the natural real interest 
rate, and hence the response of the inflation rate to these shocks is likewise muted. This helps to 
understand why, although the response of union-wide inflation to shocks differs qualitatively 
across the two regimes, the response of output is so similar across regimes.  
 
3.2.3. Occasionally binding ZLB constraint 
I next consider an equilibrium with random switches in/out of the liquidity trap. Assume as in 
Sect. 3.1. that the persistence of each regime is 0.95.SS BBp p= = In this case, the policy rules for 
union-wide inflation and output in the regime with a binding ZLB constraint (‘B’) are  
                   
m l l m0.0080 1.36 0.0080 0.07 0.03 0.07 .B tt t t tr GθΠ = − − = − + − − Ψ                     (34) 
                                       
m l l m0.0022 1.06 0.47 0.06 .Bt t t tY Gθ= − + + − Ψ                                   (35) 
The corresponding policy rules in the regime with a slack ZLB (‘S’) are 
                   
m  l l m0.0011 1.28 0.0011 0.06 0.03 0.06 ,St t t t tr GθΠ = − + = − − + + Ψ                     (36) 
                                    
m l l m0.0020 0.94 0.53 0.06 .St t t tY Gθ= + + + Ψ                                         (37) 
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Given that the two regimes are persistent, it is not surprising that the policy functions (34)-(37) 
are similar to the ones that obtain when each regime is permanent ((28),(29),(32),(33)). In 
particular, it remains true that, in a liquidity trap, a positive aggregate supply shock raises union-
wide inflation, while a positive aggregate demand shock lowers union-wide inflation. It is again 
found that the responses of union-wide output to productivity and government purchases shocks 
are similar across the two regimes. The government purchases multiplier is close to 0.5 in both 
regimes.   
 The effect of a regime shift on union-wide inflation and output depends on the level of 
the forcing variables. Note that  
m m l l m0.0042 0.12 0.06 0.12 .B St t t t tY Y Gθ− = − + − − Ψ  Thus, 
entry into a liquidity trap has a slightly more detrimental effect on union-wide output when 
productivity is low and government purchases are high.  
 
3.2.4. Country-level variables 
As discussed above, country-level inflation, consumption and output can be computed by adding 
(or subtracting) relative (Home vs. Foreign) variables from the union-wide aggregates (see (15)). 
Relative quantities depend on (current and lagged) relative forcing variables; importantly, 
relative quantities do not depend on monetary policy or on whether the economy is in a liquidity 
trap.  
 
3.3. Dynamic responses 
Table 1 reports dynamic shock responses for the baseline New Keynesian model with an 
occasionally binding ZLB constraint, and regime persistence 0.95.SS BBp p= =  1% shocks to Home 
productivity, Home government purchases and to the Home preference shifter are considered. 
Responses after 0, 5 and 10 periods are reported; see Column labelled ‘Horizon’. Panel (a) of 
Table 1 shows responses that obtain when the ZLB constraint binds, while Panel (b) shows 
responses under a slack ZLB constraint. For comparison purposes, Table 2 shows dynamic 
responses for a New Keynesian model in which the ZLB constraint is always slack ( 1).SSp =  
Table 3 shows dynamic response in an RBC (flex-prices) world.  
 In the RBC model, a positive shock to Home productivity raises Home output while 
Foreign output is unaffected. Home and Foreign consumption both rise. The rise in Home 
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consumption exceeds the increase in Foreign consumption. The Home terms of trade deteriorate. 
In the RBC model, a positive shock to Home government purchases raises union-wide output, 
but it lowers union-wide consumption. Home output rises, while Foreign output is unaffected. 
Private consumption falls in both countries—the reduction in consumption is stronger in country 
‘Home’; the Home terms of trade improve. Finally, in the RBC model a positive Home 
preference shock has zero effect on union-wide output and consumption; however, the shock 
raises Home consumption, as the shock amounts to a fall in the Home subjective discount factor; 
as union-wide output does not change, Foreign consumption falls; the rise in Home consumption 
lowers Home labor supply, and thus Home output falls, while Foreign output rises; this is 
accompanied by an improvement of the Home terms of trade. 
 Note that the dynamic equations that govern union-wide variables are isomorphic to a 
closed economy model. Tables 1 and 2 show that, in the sticky-prices economies, the responses 
of union-wide output and consumption are close to the responses in the RBC economy. This is 
consistent with the well-known fact that, in a closed economy with sticky prices, a monetary 
policy rule that stabilizes the inflation rate can imply aggregate dynamics that mimic a flex-
prices economy, and that in the face of a both aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks 
(e.g., Kollmann (2008)). For example, a rise in Home government purchases worth 1% of steady 
state Home output raises union-wide output by 0.25%, on impact, in the RBC model, compared 
to a rise of 0.26% in the sticky-prices model without ZLB constraint (Table 2); in the sticky-
prices model with an occasionally binding ZLB constraint, the corresponding increases of union-
wide output are 0.24% when the ZLB constraint binds, and 0.26% when the ZLB constraint is 
slack (see Panels (a.2) and (b.2) of Table 1).  
 However, the adjustment of relative (Home vs. Foreign) variables to country-specific  
shocks is distorted significantly, in the short term, by price stickiness, and thus it differs from the 
response of in a RBC world.  This is because price stickiness slows the adjustment of the terms 
of trade to country-specific shocks. Monetary policy in a currency union cannot undo this 
distortion. However, importantly, the adjustment of country-level does not depend much on 
whether the ZLB binds or not.  
 Consider the effects of a 1% Home productivity increase. In the sticky-prices model, the 
Home terms of trade deteriorate much less (-0.30%), on impact, than in the RBC world (-1%). 
This means that, under sticky prices, relative demand for Home output rises less (see (16)), while 
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the risk sharing condition (6) implies a more muted rise in Home relative consumption. This 
explains why, under sticky prices, Home output and consumption rise less, while Foreign output 
and consumption rise more than in the flex-prices world. (In the flex-prices world, the 1% Home 
productivity increase raises Home output by 1%, on impact, while Foreign output is unchanged; 
in the sticky-prices model, Home and Foreign output rise by 0.68% and 0.38% on impact, 
respectively, when the ZLB binds; Home and Foreign output rise by 0.62% and 0.32%, 
respectively when the ZLB is slack.)  
 Price rigidity weakens the appreciation of the Home terms of trade triggered by a positive 
shock to Home government purchases. This implies that, under nominal rigidities, the shock 
triggers a stronger rise in Home output (than in the RBC world), and a fall in Foreign output. The 
international transmission of country-specific fiscal spending shocks is, thus, negative in the 
sticky-prices model. This is the case both at the ZLB and away from the ZLB (see Table 1, 
Panels (a.2) and (b.2)). Under a binding ZLB, a rise in Home government purchases worth 1% of 
steady state Home output raises Home GDP by 0.66 on impact, while Foreign GDP drops by 
0.19%. When the ZLB does not bind, then Home and Foreign output respond by 0.69% and          
-0.16%, respectively, on impact. Because the union-wide fiscal spending multiplier is slightly 
smaller at the ZLB than away from the ZLB (due to the fact that the fiscal shock triggers a fall in 
union-wide inflation at the ZLB, but a rise in union-wide inflation away from the ZLB), the fall 
in Foreign output is slightly greater at the ZLB than away from the ZLB.  
 A similar mechanism also operates in response to a Home household demand 
(preference) shock. Price stickiness dampens the appreciation of the Home terms of trade, after a 
positive Home preference shock. This helps to understand why, under nominal rigidities, a 
positive Home preference shock raises Home output and lowers Foreign output, on impact. This 
is the case both when the ZLB constraint binds and when it is slack. (By contrast, in the RBC 
world, Home output falls, while Foreign output rises; see above.) 
 
4. Fundamental liquidity traps driven by a large negative demand shock 
This paper focuses on beliefs-driven, self-fulfilling liquidity traps. As discussed in the 
Introduction, an extensive literature assumes that liquidity traps are triggered by large adverse 
demand shocks, such as an autonomous fall in households’ subjective discount rates. Mertens 
and Ravn (2014) refer to liquidity traps of this type as “fundamental” liquidity traps. A key 
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assumption in fundamental liquidity trap models is that the liquidity trap ends when the adverse 
aggregate demand shock subsides. Once the economy has escaped from a liquidity trap, agents 
expect that the economy will never again enter a liquidity trap. See Holden (2016, 2019) for a 
comprehensive analysis of deterministic equilibria that feature a permanent exit from a liquidity 
trap. The literature shows that, in a fundamental liquidity trap, fiscal spending multipliers can be 
markedly higher than when the ZLB does not bind; also, a positive technology shock can trigger 
an output contraction (e.g., Eggertsson and Woodford (2003)).  
 Widely discussed studies by Erceg and Lindé (2010) and Blanchard et al. (2016) have 
presented quantitative models of a two-country monetary union that experiences a fundamental 
liquidity trap driven by a large adverse household demand (preference) shock; these authors 
show that, in such a liquidity trap, a country-specific rise in government purchases can have a 
strong positive effect on domestic and foreign output, i.e. the predicted international fiscal 
spillover is sizable.
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 For comparison purposes with the expectations-driven liquidity traps analyzed in this 
paper, I now discuss a fundamental liquidity trap, in the stylized two-country model of a 
monetary union used above. Following Blanchard et al. (2016), I consider a scenario in which a 
liquidity trap is brought about by an unanticipated one-time shock at some initial date t=0 that 
depresses the union-wide natural real interest rate below its steady level, so that  l0 0.r <  Except 
for shocks at date t=0, there are no random disturbances. Thus the economy evolves 
deterministically (perfect foresight), after t=0. There exists a unique deterministic equilibrium in 
which the economy permanently leaves the liquidity trap after a finite time interval.
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As that there are no exogenous innovations after date t=0, the natural real interest rate at 
t≥0 is:  l0 0,t tr rρ= ⋅ <  where 0<ρ<1 is the autocorrelation of the exogenous forcing processes and 
of the natural rate (see (14)).  
In a deterministic equilibrium without ZLB constraint, the union-wide inflation rate and 
the nominal interest rate at dates t≥0 would be  
                                                 
9 Open economy models of liquidity traps induced by large adverse demand shock are also studied by, e.g., Jeanne 
(2009), Cook and Devereux (2013), Fujiwara and Ueda (2013), Farhi and Werning (2016), Acharya and Bengui 
(2018) and Fornaro and Romei (2019). 
10 In the model here, the Phillips-Euler equation for union-wide inflation (see (14)) does not include lagged 
endogenous state variables. As shown by Holden (2016, 2019), this ensures that an equilibrium featuring eventual 
exit from the liquidity trap is unique; models with endogenous state variables may have multiple deterministic 
equilibria that eventually escape from the liquidity trap.  
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                                       m l* 0St t rλ ρΠ =  and m l* 1 0,St ti rπγ λ ρ+ =                                             (38) 
respectively, where 0
Sλ >  is the policy rule coefficient for a regime with a permanently slack 
ZLB constraint defined in (31). A fundamental liquidity trap occurs when the unconstrained 
nominal interest rate is negative at date t=0, i.e. when (expressing the interest rate in deviation 
from steady state):  
                                                  l*1 ( )/ .i β< − Π− Π                                                            (39) 
This inequality holds when the real natural rate at date t=0 is sufficiently low. Assume that (39) 
applies, and let *T  be the smallest value of t≥0 for which m* 1 ( )/ .ti β+ ≥ − Π− Π  Thus,   
                                             l** ( )/Ti β< − Π− Π  and n** 1 ( )/ .Ti β+ ≥ − Π− Π                                        (40) 
The fundamental liquidity trap equilibrium studied by Blanchard et al. (2016) has the property 
that the ZLB constraint binds until period *T -1, and that the ZLB does not bind in *.t T≥  Thus, 
m m*
t tΠ =Π  and m m*1 1t ti i+ +=  hold for *t T≥  (where m*tΠ  and m* 1ti +  are defined in (38)). In periods *,t T<  
the nominal interest rate is zero, i.e. m1 ( )/ .ti β+ = − Π− Π  From the Euler-Phillips equation (14), we 
see that union-wide inflation for *0 t T≤ <  has to obey the condition 
m n n 11
1 2( )/ (1 ) .t t t tr
β β
κ κ κβ + + +− Π− Π = − Π + + Π − Π +   Thus,   
                        m n n 1 2( )/ (1 )t t t trκ β β κ β κ+ +Π = Π− Π + + + Π − Π +   for *0 t T≤ < .                       (41) 
Iterating backward in time using (41) allows to compute union-wide inflation in periods 
*0 .t T≤ <  11 Importantly, the largest root of the “backward” inflation equation (41) exceeds 
unity. Thus, the backward inflation loop is explosive. This implies that the impact inflation 
response (at t=0) of the shock that triggers a fundamental liquidity trap can be large, as 
confirmed by the simulations below. Also, shocks to the natural real interest rate that induce 
small changes in the inflation rate in periods *T  and * 1,T +  i.e. when the economy emerges from 
the liquidity trap, may have a big effect on inflation, and thus on output, at the start of the 
liquidity trap. This explains why fiscal multipliers in a fundamental liquidity trap can be (very) 
large.  
                                                 
11 Inflation in 
*
1T −  (last period of the liquidity trap) is n n n n* * * ** *1 1 1( )/ (1 )T T T Trκ β β κ β κ− + −Π = Π− Π+ + + Π − Π +   etc. 
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 Table 4 reports dynamic responses to shocks, in a fundamental liquidity trap. All 
preference, technology and price stickiness parameters are set at the values used in previous 
Sections. The exogenous forcing processes again have autocorrelation ρ=0.95.    
Following Blanchard et al. (2016), I consider a baseline fundamental liquidity trap 
scenario that starts in period t=0, and that that lasts 12 quarters. In the model here, that baseline 
scenario is brought about by an unanticipated one-time -9.90% innovation to Home and Foreign 
preference parameters (Ψ)  at t=0 that depresses the union-wide natural real interest rate by 49.50 
basis points, on impact.  
Panel (a) of Table 4 reports the adjustment process, under the baseline scenario. Panels 
(b.1)-(b.3) report dynamics under alternative scenarios that obtain when positive 1% date t=0 
innovations to Home productivity, Home government purchases and the Home preference 
parameter HΨ  are added to the baseline scenario. Effects of those Home shocks are shown as 
deviations from the baseline scenario. 
12
  
The baseline liquidity trap scenario (Panel (a)) exhibits a sharp, but short-lived, 
contraction in union-wide inflation and output. Union-wide inflation drops by 28.56 ppt, 19.42 
ppt, 13.36 ppt and 6.71 ppt (per annum) below steady state, in quarters 0 to 3 after the baseline 
shock, while union-wide output is 13.68%, 9.07%, 6.00% and 2.61% below steady state in the 
same periods.  
During the liquidity trap, exogenous Home productivity, government purchases and 
preference shocks have a strong effect on output and inflation, in both countries, as can be seen 
in Panel (b) of Table 4. A 1% positive innovation (at t=0) to Home productivity lowers union-
wide inflation and output by 13.14 ppt and 6.10%, respectively, on impact. Given the muted 
short-run response of the terms of trade, due to price stickiness, Home and Foreign output both 
drop sharply on impact, by 5.95% and 6.26%, respectively (see Panel (b.1)). An innovation to 
Home government purchases worth 1% of Home steady state output raises union-wide inflation 
and output by 4.64 ppt and 2.59%, on impact (Panel (b.2)). This very strong rise in union-wide 
output and the muted terms of trade response imply that Home and Foreign output both rise 
strongly, in the short run. On impact, Home and Foreign output go up by 3.01% and 2.16%, 
respectively.  Thus, the cross-country spillover of government purchases is positive and sizable.  
                                                 
12 Shock responses, relative to a given baseline scenario, do not depend on the combination of changes in , ,,H t F tΨ Ψ
that generates that baseline scenario.    
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4. Conclusion 
The paper investigates expectations-driven liquidity traps in a two-country New Keynesian 
model of a monetary union. In the model here, country-specific productivity shocks induce 
synchronized responses of domestic and foreign output, while country-specific public and private 
demand shocks trigger asymmetric domestic and foreign responses. In particular, a rise in 
government purchases in an individual country lowers GDP in the rest of the union. The present 
paper cautions against the idea of strong cross-border fiscal transmission in a monetary union, 
during a liquidity trap. 
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Table 1. New Keynesian model with occasionally binding ZLB constraint: dynamic responses 
to exogenous shocks  
 
                                                                                                                                 Exogenous 
Horizon  Y     C     Π     i  YH      YF        CH       CF  ΠH     ΠF          q  variables 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)        (11)           (12) 
(a) Binding ZLB constraint  
(a.1) Home productivity increase          θ
H 
 0 0.53 0.53 0.14 0.00 0.68     0.38      0.62  0.44 -0.47 0.75 -0.30 1.00 
 5 0.43 0.43 0.11 0.00 0.78 0.09 0.64 0.23 0.06 0.16 -0.69 0.81 
10 0.32 0.32 0.08 0.00 0.62 0.02 0.50 0.14 0.13 0.03 -0.60 0.60 
 
(a.2) Home government purchases increase         G
H
 
 0 0.24 -0.27 -0.07 0.00 0.66 -0.19 -0.31 -0.22 0.24 -0.37 0.15 1.00 
 5 0.19 -0.22 -0.06 0.00 0.43 -0.04 -0.32 -0.11 -0.03 -0.08 0.34 0.81 
10 0.14 -0.16 -0.04 0.00 0.29 -0.01 -0.25 -0.07 -0.07 -0.02 0.30 0.60 
 
(a.3) Home private demand increase (preference shock)      Ψ
H
 
 0 -0.03 -0.03 -0.14 0.00 0.15 -0.21 0.40 -0.46 0.35 -0.62 0.24 1.00 
 5 -0.02 -0.02 -0.11 0.00 -0.06 0.01 0.22 -0.27 -0.07 -0.16 0.55 0.81 
10 -0.02 -0.02 -0.08 0.00 -0.08 0.04 0.14 -0.17 -0.12 -0.04 0.48 0.60 
 
(b) Slack ZLB constraint 
(b.1) Home productivity increase          θ
H
 
 0 0.47 0.47 -0.13 -0.19 0.62 0.32 0.56 0.38 -0.74 0.48 -0.30 1.00 
 5 0.38 0.38 -0.11 -0.16 0.73 0.04 0.59 0.18 -0.16 -0.05 -0.69 0.81 
10 0.28 0.28 -0.08 -0.12 0.58 -0.02 0.46 0.10 -0.03 -0.13 -0.60 0.60 
 
(b.2) Home government purchases increase         G
H
 
 0 0.26 -0.24 0.06 0.10 0.69 -0.16 -0.28 -0.19 0.37 -0.24 0.15 1.00 
 5 0.22 -0.19 0.05 0.08 0.45 -0.02 -0.30 -0.09 0.08 0.03 0.34 0.81 
10 0.16 -0.14 0.04 0.06 0.31 0.01 -0.23 -0.05 0.01 0.07 0.30 0.60 
 
(b.3) Home private demand increase (preference shock)      Ψ
H
 
 0 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.19 0.21 -0.15 0.46 -0.40 0.62 -0.36 0.24 1.00 
 5 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.16 -0.01 0.05 0.27 -0.22 0.15 0.06 0.55 0.81 
10 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.12 -0.04 0.08 0.17 -0.14 0.04 0.12 0.48 0.60 
 
Notes: Dynamic responses to 1% innovations to exogenous variables are reported. Responses 0, 5 and 
10 periods after the shock are shown (see Column labelled ‘Horizon’). Panel (a) shows responses that 
obtain when the ZLB constraint binds (liquidity trap); Panel (b) assumes that the ZLB constraint is 
slack. Variables: union-wide output (Y), union-wide consumption (C), union-wide inflation (Π), nominal 
interest rate (i); Home (H) and Foreign (F) output (Y
H
,Y
F
), consumption
 
(C
H
,C
F
), inflation
 
(Π
H
, Π
F
) and 
Home terms of trade (q). Shocks to Home productivity (θ
H
), Home government purchases (G
H
) and to 
the Home intertemporal preference shifter (Ψ
H
) are considered. Output, consumption and the terms of 
trade are reported as % deviations from steady state; the interest rate and inflation are reported as 
percentage point (ppt) per annum differences from steady state.      
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Table 2. New Keynesian model in which the ZLB never binds: dynamic responses to 
exogenous shocks  
 
Horizon  Y     C     Π     i  YH      YF        CH       CF  ΠH     ΠF   q 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 
 (1) Home productivity increase  
 0 0.49 0.49 -0.18 -0.27 0.64 0.33 0.58 0.40 -0.79 0.43 -0.30 
 5 0.40 0.40 -0.15 -0.22 0.74 0.05 0.60 0.19 -0.20 -0.09 -0.69 
10 0.29 0.29 -0.11 -0.16 0.59 -0.01 0.47 0.11 -0.05 -0.16 -0.60 
 
(2) Home government purchases increase  
 0 0.26 -0.24 0.09 0.13 0.68 -0.17 -0.29 -0.20 0.39 -0.22 0.15 
 5 0.21 -0.20 0.07 0.11 0.45 -0.03 -0.30 -0.10 0.09 0.04 0.34 
10 0.15 -0.15 0.05 0.08 0.30 0.00 -0.24 -0.06 0.03 0.08 0.30 
 
(3) Home private demand increase (preference shock) 
 0 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.27 0.19 -0.17 0.44 -0.41 0.67 -0.31 0.24  
 5 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.22 -0.02 0.04 0.25 -0.23 0.19 0.10 0.55 
10 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.16 -0.05 0.07 0.16 -0.15 0.07 0.15 0.48  
 
Notes: Dynamic responses to 1% innovations to exogenous variables are reported. See Table 1 for 
definition of variables and other information.   
 
 
 
Table 3. RBC model: dynamic responses to exogenous shocks  
 
Horizon  Y     C     Π     i  YH      YF        CH       CF  ΠH     ΠF   q 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 
 (1) Home productivity increase  
 0 0.50 0.50 --- --- 1.00 0.00 0.80 0.20 --- --- -1.00 
 5 0.41 0.41 -- --- 0.81 0.00 0.65 0.16 --- --- -0.81 
10 0.30 0.30 --- --- 0.60 0.00 0.48 0.12 --- --- -0.60 
 
(2) Home government purchases increase  
 0 0.25 -0.25 --- --- 0.50 0.00 -0.40 -0.10 --- --- 0.50 
 5 0.20 -0.20 --- --- 0.41 0.00 -0.33 -0.08 --- --- 0.41 
10 0.15 -0.15 --- --- 0.30 0.00 -0.24 -0.06 --- --- 0.30 
 
(3) Home private demand increase (preference shock) 
 0 0.00 0.00 --- --- -0.10 0.10 0.26 -0.26 --- --- 0.80 
 5 0.00 0.00 --- --- -0.08 0.08 0.21 -0.21 --- --- 0.65  
10 0.00 0.00 --- --- -0.06 0.06 0.16 -0.16 --- --- 0.48  
 
Notes: Dynamic responses to 1% innovations to exogenous variables are reported. See Table 1 for 
definition of variables and other information.   
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Table 4. New Keynesian model with a fundamental liquidity trap (12 periods): baseline 
liquidity trap scenario and dynamic responses to exogenous shocks  
 
                                                                                                                               Exogenous 
Horizon  Y     C     Π     i  YH      YF        CH       CF  ΠH     ΠF          q  variables 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)        (11)           (12) 
 
(a) Baseline scenario (triggered by adverse shocks to Home and Foreign private demand) Ψ
H
 &Ψ
F
 
 0 -13.68 -13.68 -28.56 0.00 -13.68 -13.68 -13.68 -13.68 -28.56 -28.56 0.00 -9.90 
 5 -2.61 -2.61 -6.71 0.00 -2.61 -2.61 -2.61 -2.61 -6.71 -6.71 0.00 -7.66 
10 -0.20 -0.20 -2.12 0.00 -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -2.12 -2.12 0.00 -5.93 
11  -0.16 -0.16 -1.99 0.00 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -1.99 -1.99 0.00 -5.63 
12   -0.15 -0.15 -1.89 0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -1.89 -1.89 0.00 -5.35 
   
(b) Dynamic responses to shocks (shown as difference relative to baseline scenario)  
(b.1) Home productivity increase          θ
H
 
 0 -6.10 -6.10 -13.14 0.00 -5.95 -6.26 -6.01 -6.19 -13.74 -12.53 -0.30 1.00 
 5 -0.88 -0.88 -2.53 0.00 -0.54 -1.23 -0.68 -1.09 -2.58 -2.47 -0.69 0.81 
10 0.21 0.21 -0.19 0.00 0.51 -0.09 0.39 0.03 -0.14 -0.24 -0.60 0.60 
11 0.24 0.24 -0.13 0.00 0.52 -0.05 0.41 0.07 -0.07 -0.18 -0.57 0.57 
12 0.26 0.26 -0.10 -0.14 0.54 -0.01 0.43 0.10 -0.04 -0.15 -0.54 0.54 
 
(b.2) Home government purchases increase         G
H
 
 0 2.59 2.09 4.64 0.00 3.01 2.16 2.04 2.13 4.94 4.33 0.15 1.00 
 5 0.66 0.25 0.88 0.00 0.90 0.43 0.15 0.36 0.91 0.86 0.34 0.81 
10 0.17 -0.13 0.07 0.00 0.32 0.02 -0.21 -0.04 0.04 0.09 0.30 0.60 
11 0.15 -0.14 0.05 0.07 0.29 0.01 -0.22 -0.05 0.02 0.08 0.29 0.57 
12 0.14 -0.13 0.05 0.07 0.27 0.01 -0.21 -0.05 0.02 0.07 0.27 0.54 
 
(b.3) Home private demand increase (preference shock)      Ψ
H
 
 0 4.65 4.65 9.23 0.00 4.83 4.47 5.08 4.23 9.71 8.74 0.24 1.00 
 5 0.91 0.91 1.76 0.00 0.88 0.94 1.15 0.67 1.80 1.71 0.55 0.81 
10 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.00 -0.01 0.11 0.21 -0.11 0.09 0.18 0.48 0.60 
11 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.15 -0.05 0.07 0.16 -0.14 0.06 0.14 0.46 0.57 
12 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.14 -0.05 0.06 0.15 -0.13 0.05 0.14 0.44 0.54 
 
 
 
Notes: Panel (a) reports the baseline scenario of a “fundamental” liquidity trap equilibrium lasting 12 
quarters. Panel (b) reports dynamic responses of 1% innovations to exogenous variables (the responses 
are shown as differences compared to the baseline scenario). Output, consumption and the terms of 
trade are reported as % deviations from steady state; the interest rate and inflation are reported as 
percentage point (ppt) per annum differences from steady state. See Table 1 for definition of variables.  
 
